1.       INTRODUCTION

This Petition presents a question that goes to the core of judicial integrity: whether a district court may refuse to confront structural fraud on the court committed by its own officer, when that fraud directly taints subsequent criminal proceedings. A court-appointed receiver vested with exclusive control over Petitioners’ assets and records fabricated IRS documents, falsely represented that a multi-million-dollar tax claim had been extinguished, and used that deception to sustain the receivership and fund his fees. The Government has never disputed that its evidence against Petitioner derives from the Receiver, nor has it refuted the fact that the Receiver fabricated documents to mislead the Court.

  The fraud unfolded in the context of a “parallel prosecution.” The Federal Trade Commission first filed a civil enforcement action alleging deceptive trade practices.^[1]   At the FTC’s request, the court appointed a Receiver with sweeping authority over Petitioners’ assets, records, and communications. That receivership became the Government’s pipeline of information, documents and data: every record, email, and financial document passed through the Receiver’s control before being turned over to law

 

enforcement. But for the Receiver’s control of Petitioners’ property, the Government would not have had access to the very records and data that later formed the backbone of its indictment. When the civil case ended, the Department of Justice filed a criminal indictment based on the same allegations, built entirely on documents and data that had been filtered and produced through the Receiver’s fraudulent administration.

The Receiver’s fraud was not incidental. In the middle of the receivership, the Receiver reported that the IRS had asserted a $2.7 million tax claim against Mrs. Cardiff. Six days later, he filed papers purporting to show that the IRS had forgiven the debt, attaching what appeared to be an amended proof of claim along with a fax cover sheet and represented that communications with the IRS had taken place. FOIA responses and government records later confirmed the documents were forgeries and the IRS had no records of any communication with the Receiver or his agents about eliminating the tax liability. This fabrication allowed the Receiver to preserve the receivership, pay himself fees, The Department of Justice, in turn, built its indictment exclusively on tainted documents and data provided by the Receiver.  

When Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment based on fraud on the court, the district court did not address the fraud at all. Instead, the court reframed the motion as an “evidentiary issue,” reasoning that alleged forgeries by the court-appointed Receiver raised “inherently factual questions” reserved for the jury and thus could not be decided pretrial. Crim. Dkt. 267 at 23–24. That ruling was clear error.  Fraud on the court is not an evidentiary dispute, nor does it turn on the sufficiency of trial proof. It is a structural defect that the court itself—not a jury—must adjudicate to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. See Hazel–Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford–Empire Co., 322 U.S.

238, 246 (1944); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946); Levander v. Prober, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 1999).

The district court’s refusal to act is clearly erroneous and threatens confidence in the integrity of the criminal proceedings. This Court should grant the Petition, reaffirm that district courts have the power and duty to address fraud on the court whenever uncovered, and direct dismissal of the indictment or such other relief as necessary to restore the integrity of the judicial process.

II. ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether a district court may defer an issue of fraud on the court to a jury, rather than exercise its own duty to address unrebutted evidence that a court-appointed Receiver committed fraud on the court by fabricated IRS filings and tainted the Government’s criminal case?

        III.     STATEMENT OF FACTS 

In 2018, the Federal Trade Commission initiated civil enforcement proceedings against Jason Edward Thomas Cardiff, his wife Eunjung Cardiff, and their company Redwood Scientific Technologies, Inc., in the Central

District of California. See FTC v. Cardiff, No. 5:18-cv-02104-DMG (C.D. Cal.) (the “FTC Case”). The Commission alleged deceptive marketing of smoking cessation and other products and sought equitable relief under

Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).²

A. The Receivership in the FTC Case

The district court entered a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. The court appointed Robb Evans & Associates LLC as Receiver, ^[2] vesting it with sweeping authority to seize control over

 

² As set out in greater detail below, the Government obtained an indictment based on the same facts and evidence adduced in the FTC Case.

 

Redwood’s operations, assets, and records. The order empowered the Receiver to act as a fiduciary of the court, to “preserve, protect, and manage” estate assets, and to provide the court with truthful, accurate accountings.  FTC Dkt. 46 at 5-6, 18-25, FTC Dkt. 59 at 8, 22-26.^[3]   The Receiver had a fiduciary duty to both Redwood and to preserve and manage the affairs of the Cardiffs.  This included settling claims against the individual defendants.  See SEC v. Schooler, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46870 (S.D. Cal.)

The scope of this receivership extended not merely to Redwood’s bank accounts and assets but also to its email systems, servers, business records, and corporate communications. FTC Dkt. 46 The Receiver became the primary custodian of all documents, data, records and information later used by the Government in pursuing criminal charges. As such, the Receiver was indisputably an “officer of the court,” bound by heightened fiduciary obligations and charged with candor to the judiciary.

The Receivership was controversial. Defendants challenged the

Receiver’s  neutrality and his mismanagement of VPL Medical, Inc ⁵ 

 

 

including failure to pay VPL vendors and maintain a multi-million dollar contract with the federal government.    FTC Dkt. 391 at 8-17._This prompted the Court to admonish the Receiver “The Receiver must be mindful of its obligations to remain impartial and the particular need in this case for urgency, given the tight timelines and the specter of another national shortage of personal protective  equipment.”   FTC Dkt. 403 at 4 (emphasis supplied). Following the Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021), the district judge ordered the Receivership wound down.  FTC Dkt 683.  It was during this winding down period that the Receiver committed several acts of fraud on the court.

On September 10, 2021, the Receiver filed its “Summary Accounting with Allocations” (FTC Dkt. 654, Crim. Dkt. 231 at 6). ^[4]  Attached was an IRS “Proof of Claim Amendment No. 1” reflecting a tax liability of $2,787,989.73 against the Cardiffs for tax year 2014.  FTC Dkt. 654 The claim named “Leonard Brown, Bankruptcy Specialist” at the Internal Revenue Service. In pertinent part, the Receiver told the Court:

 

remanded to the district based on the Supreme Court’s decision in AMG

Capital Management v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67 (2021)

 

 It is clear that the New IRS Claim is in excess of the balances in the receivership estate. There are insufficient funds in the receivership estate to pay the New IRS Claim in full. The New IRS Claim therefore raises a host of issues that have to be addressed… For instance, the New IRS Claim (Exhibit 2) asserts that some or all of the IRS claimed amounts are subject to a tax lien in favor of the IRS, and that the New IRS Claim has legal priority for payment from the Surplus Funds over the nonadministrative claims of the other creditors of the receivership estate. As previously noted, there is only one receivership estate, one "qualified settlement fund" ("QSF"). The IRS may now be claiming the Surplus Funds in the receivership estate, in the QSF, after payment of the Remaining Fees.

 

FTC Dkt. 654 at 5.  The Receiver’s submission recognized that full or substantial payment of the $2.7 million IRS Claim would deplete funds available to pay the Receiver’s fees. Id. 

Only six days later, on September 16, 2021, the Receiver filed an “IRS Claim Update to the Receiver’s Summary Accounting” (FTC Dkt. 657). This submission asserted that the IRS had issued “Amendment No. 2,” and reported to the court that the IRS had agreed to eliminate the 2014, $2.7 million dollar tax liability.  FTC Dkt. at 657 at 2.  The filing included a second fax cover sheet again purporting to be transmitted from Leonard Brown, IRS, to the Receiver’s staff.  Service lists represented that “IRS Claim Update” had been faxed or emailed to Mr. Brown and other IRS personnel.  FTC Dkt. 657 at 10.

The impact of this purported amended claim was significant. The reduced IRS liability freed up millions of dollars within the estate, allowing the Receiver to prioritize payment of its own fees and administrative expenses, to participate in adjudicating competing claims, and to wind down the case without accounting for a large IRS debt. See FTC Dkt. 683 (Windup Order), 716 (Order Approving the Receiver’s Final Report and Accounting and the Receiver’s Final Fee Application).  Judge Gee approved the Receiver’s accounting based on the Receiver’s representations and recommendations.  FTC Dkt. 683 at 9.  7-8.  For their part, the Cardiffs believed that the Receiver had settled a $2.7 million tax claim.   Crim. Dkt. 231-5 ¶ 5.  After the Final Judgment and Injunction was entered by the Court, the Cardiffs decided to relocate to Dublin Ireland. Crim Dkt. 231-5 ¶ 1.

It is important to note that, at the time, Jason and Eunjung Cardiff had no practical ability or reason to test the Receiver’s submissions because the documents bore the appearance of authenticity: IRS letterhead, fax cover sheets naming IRS officials, and detailed proof-of-claim forms. The

Receiver’s status as a neutral fiduciary of the court lent an aura of credibility to these submissions. The Cardiffs, in fact, had every reason to accept the Receiver’s representations because they reflected what appeared to be an extraordinary benefit—the extinguishment of a $2.7 million IRS claim. 

The district court, in approving the Receiver’s final accounting, relied upon those submissions in good faith leading to other court orders distributing funds to creditors, including an order authorizing a state court interpleader action to wind down and distribute receivership funds.  FTC Dkt. 598 at  7-8.

B. Discovery of Forged IRS Documents and Receiver Fraud

In mid-2024, Eunjung Cardiff applied for passport renewal and was informed that the application could not proceed due to excessive and outstanding IRS debt from tax year 2014. Crim. Dkt. 231-5 ¶¶s 9-10, Ex. 2. Mrs. Cardiff, believing that the Receiver had secured an amended proof of claim eliminating the 2014 IRS liability, was stunned.  Crim. Dkt. 231-5 ¶¶s 12-13.

Petitioner had multiple conversations and communications with front line and upper level Management at the IRS including Lenard Brown (Crim.

Dkt. 231-6 ¶¶s 4-7) and with Sabina Makarova, an IRS Manager.  Crim. Dkt.

231-6 ¶¶s 8-9).  They both confirmed that there was no credit granted for the

$2.7 million tax claim.  Id.  Ms. Makarova confirmed that the balance on the 2014 tax year remained at over $4 million with no offset being entered into the two IRS systems (AIS or IDRS).    Crim. Dkt. 231-6 ¶ 9.

Ms. Cardiff then followed up with a FOIA request to the IRS regarding the fraudulent form in question.

On April 27, 2025, Ms. Cardiff made Freedom of Information Act

(“FOIA”) requests.  Dkt. 252 ¶ 2.  The IRS responded on May 27, 2025 with definitive answers. Crim. Dkt. 252-1 at 5.   In its May 27, 2025

correspondence, the IRS confirmed that, after diligent search:

Dear Eunjung Cardiff:

We are writing to provide a final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request we received on April 28, 2025. You requested the following:

1.                 All versions of IRS Form 4490 (Proof of Claim), and any amended Forms 4490, referencing tax year 2014 submitted under the name or TIN of Eunjung Cardiff (SSN: _____-____).

2.                 The complete transaction history or account

transcript for tax year 2014, including any transaction dates, filing dates, credit postings, amended claim filings, credits posted, amended claim filings, and associated metadata indicating when the document was officially processed or logged into IRS systems (AIS, IDRS, or other).

3.                 All internal or external correspondence,

including emails, memoranda, and fax transmission logs (if any), between Leonard Brown, Sabina Makarov, Richard Goldstein and IRS third parties (including but not limited to court-appointed receivers or their legal representatives) regarding amended IRS claims filed in the matter of FTC v. Cardiff, Case No. 5:18-cv02104-DMG-PLA.

4.                 Copies of any fax cover sheets, electronic

transmission confirmations, and fax transmission logs or routing metadata connected to the submission or receipt of any version of form 4490 related to this matter.

Regarding item #1, #3 and #4

A search was conducted, and no records were located in response to your request. (emphasis supplied)

Crim. Dkt. 252-1 at 5.  These FOIA responses established that the so-called “Amendment No. 2” filed by the Receiver in FTC Dkt. 657 never originated from the IRS. The purported faxes and amended Form 4490 were fabrications and forgeries. 

IRS account transcripts, obtained by the Cardiffs independently of the FOIA, showed that as of 2025 the 2014 liability had ballooned from $2.7 million to over $4 million with penalties and interest. Crim. Dkt. 231-5 at 5 Far from “forgiving” the claim, the IRS continued to treat the debt as active and enforceable. The only reasonable inference was that the Receiver’s 2021 “update” had been fabricated to free estate assets and facilitate payment of his own past and continuing fees. 

As set out in greater detail below, the Government did not produce a single IRS record showing that an amended Form 4490 exists.  See Crim. Dkt. 241.  It did not offer testimony from any IRS official. Id. It did not provide metadata or transmission logs. The Government simply wrongly argued that the issue was an “evidentiary” matter for the jury (Crim. Dkt. 241 at 7-8) and misinterpreted an email authored by Petitioner.  Crim. Dkt. 241 at 12-13.

C. Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss Based on Fraud on the Court  and the Government’s Response.

On April 27, 2025, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the indictment based on fraud on the Court. Crim. Dkt. 231. In pertinent part, Petitioner argued that: (1) there was fraud on the court due to newly discovered FOIA evidence showing that Dkt 657 was forged by the Receiver; (2) the Receiver had previously engaged in altering an email sent by Petitioner challenging his accounting; and (3) that the Receiver had intentionally destroyed evidence that would have assisted Defendant in his defense. Crim. Dkt. 231

In its Opposition to Defendant’s Fifth Motion to Dismiss (Crim. Dkt. 241), the Government did not dispute that the IRS never agreed to a settlement of the IRS claim and failed to directly address the FOIA Response.^[5]  Crim Dkt. 241 at 2-3.   The Government did not produce any evidence or testimony that rebutted the FOIA Response.  Nor did the Government dispute Petitioner’s contention that “Each of the four charges against Mr. Cardiff relies heavily on records provided by the Receiver, a court appointed officer whose repeated acts of forgery have irreparably tainted the judicial process.” 

Dkt. 231 at 13.   Instead, the Government claimed that sufficiency of the

 

evidence cannot be challenged in a pretrial motion. Crim. Dkt. 241 at 7-8; Crim Dkt. 246 at 2-4.  

The Government did dispute: (1) whether the Receiver photoshopped  e-amils, removing a key paragraph and moving up Petitioner’s signature line that challenged the Receiver’s accounting and (2) whether the Receiver intentionally destroyed evidence to prevent Petitioner from obtaining evidence favorable to this defense.  Dkt. 241 at 9-12.  Because the

Government did not rebut the evidence contained in the FOIA Response, this Court need not reach all the fact issues raised in the motion to dismiss based on fraud on the court. However, the disputed issues illustrate the impact of fraud on the court and cast serious doubt as to the objectivity of this Receiver in this case.

1. The Government Disputed Whether the Receiver Tampered with an Email Challenging his Accounting.

    Petitioner challenged the Receiver’s accounting regarding VPL Medical, Inc, a company that was owned by Bobby Bedi and Jason Cardiff during the FTC Case.  FTC Dkt. 598 at 4.   Petitioner raised concerns about the Receiver’s Final Report and Accounting Re VPL Medical, Inc. (Crim. Dkt. 231 at FTC Dkt. 580) filed by the Receiver on May 7, 2021, which represented that there was a shortfall in VPL’s funds when Petitioner believed VPL was entitled to over $1,000,000 in funds. Crim. Dkt. 231 at 8-9.¶¶s 1214 The accounting provided to the Court would have left VPL with no funds to operate while paying all of the Receiver’s fees.  Crim, Dkt. 231 at 9 ¶ 13.  

In an email exchange with the Receiver dated May 13, 2021, Petitioner questioned the Receiver’s accounting methods and asked very specific questions about how funds were being calculated and from which bank accounts.   Crim. Dkt. 231 at 9-10 ¶¶s 14, 16.   In a responsive brief submitted to the district court, the Receiver submitted a truncated version of the email. Crim. Dkt. 231 at 9 ¶ 15.  The Receiver removed Cardiff’s paragraph questioning the Receiver’s practices and then repositioned his e-mail signature line directly beneath the remaining text, creating the impression that

Cardiff had simply agreed to the Receiver’s conduct. Petitioner filed Objection to Receiver’s Use of Altered or Forged Document in Dkt. 586-1.

When the full email was later produced, the discrepancy was obvious. The Receiver’s exhibit was not a faithful representation of Cardiff’s communication; it was an altered document calculated to mislead the court about Cardiff’s position. The Court in the FTC Case did not rule on the issue.  See Dkt. 598.  Tellingly, in a responsive declaration, the Receiver did not deny the fact that he photoshopped the email.  FTC Dkt. 586-1 at 4 ¶14. Instead, the Receiver stated that Petitioner’s “accounting complaints were unrelated to the Receiver’s Final VPL Report.  FTC Case 281-1 at 2, 4.^[6] 

2. The Government Disputed Whether The Receiver Intentionally Destroyed Documents and Data 

 Petitioner pointed out that the Receiver abandoned his duty to remain impartial, stating, for example that the Receiver destroyed Google Drive evidence. Crim. Dkt. 231 at 10 ¶ 19.  This material included corporate records, documents and data, including the Google Suite account that housed Redwood’s audit logs, sales records, staff handwritten logbooks, customer sales log sheets and reports of customer charges and rebills as well as Nest Cam recordings of actual Redwood management meetings between Petitioner and his managers.  Crim. Dkt. 231 at 10¶ 1.  The Receiver admitted that he “did not renew intentionally to avoid alerting Cardiff of any interest in the data”  Crim Dkt. 231 at 10, citing Crim. Dkt. 79 at 4.  

 

D. The Trial Court’s Order 

The trial court held that Petitioner’s motion to dismiss based on fraud on the court implicated evidentiary issues that cannot be addressed in a pretrial motion because it raises “inherently factual questions that ‘invade the province of the ultimate finder of fact.”  Dkt. 267 at 23.  The court also noted that the trial court in the FTC Case determined that the alleged fraud did not require the judgment to be set aside.  Id. at 24. Thirdly, the Court found that the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in United States v. Sierra Pacific Indus., Inc.,

862 F.3d 1157 (9^th Cir. 1017) and Levander v. Prober, 180 F.3d 1114 (9^th Cir. 1999) do not stand for the proposition that a court may dismiss an indictment based on allegations of fraud via forged evidence of the court.  Instead, the Court held that trial courts have limited authority to dismiss an indictment and challenges to the reliability of the evidence does not warrant dismissal of the indictment.  Id. at 24.

        III.    FRAUD ON THE COURT 

Fraud on the court is not simply a defense theory or evidentiary objection. It is a doctrine rooted in the inherent power of the judiciary to protect the integrity of its own processes. When an officer of the court fabricates documents or falsifies evidence that is presented to the tribunal, the fraud “defiles the judicial process” and requires immediate remedial action. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).

In Hazel-Atlas, the Court reversed a judgment 10 years after it became final because a lawyer had secretly authored an article submitted as independent evidence. The Court explained that fraud on the court is “a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public” and that courts have a duty to set aside judgments obtained through such fraud whenever such fraud comes to light. 322 U.S. at 246. Similarly, in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991), the Court confirmed that courts possess inherent authority to sanction conduct that abuses the judicial process, beyond what is provided in the rules.

In the Ninth Circuit, the doctrine has been consistently recognized. In United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 443 (9th Cir. 2011), the Court held that fraud on the court occurs when there is “an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.” Such fraud, the Court explained, “defiles the court itself.” Similarly, in In re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999), the Court vacated a judgment upon discovering that a corporation’s attorneys misrepresented facts about the party in interest, misleading the court and opposing party. “The inquiry…focuses not so much in terms of whether the allege fraud prejudiced the opposing party but more in terms of whether the alleged fraud harms the integrity of the judicial process.”  Id. at 1120.

This Petition does not ask the Court to weigh the Government’s proof or forecast trial outcomes. It asks the Court to remedy fraud on the court that has disabled the criminal process from the start. In 2018, in the related FTC Case, the district court appointed a Receiver “to take exclusive custody and control” of the Petitioner’s  business and personal records “all records… computers… and any and all cloud-based data.” From that point forward, the Receiver became the sole custodian and conduit for the documents, data and all records the Government proposes to use in this prosecution. FTC Dk. 46 at 5-6, 18-25, Dkt. 59 at 8, 22-26.

The problem is not the weight of any one exhibit. The problem is structural: the court-appointed Receiver an officer of the court—forged an IRS “amended claim” (the IRS confirms it does not exist), altered an email submitted to the civil court, and is now deceased. The receivership is closed. There is no way to test or rehabilitate the provenance of any item that passed through his hands. Because the Government “relied heavily” (indeed exclusively) on Receiver-sourced records, the entire working record for pretrial litigation is corrupted—not just the trial proof. FTC Dkt. 79 at 4-5,

13-16; Dkt. 267 at 15-17.

 That is why the district court’s “let the jury sort it out” approach constitutes clear error. The issue is not evidentiary sufficiency; it is whether the judicial machinery may rely on a record constructed and curated by a court officer who committed fraud on the court. Fraud vitiates everything it touches.  No party—not the Government, not the defense, and not the court—can rely on documents tainted by fraud whether it be compliance with Brady/Giglio obligation, motions to suppress or any other pretrial function.

IV.     THE BAUMAN FACTORS POINT HEAVILY TO GRANTING THIS PETITION.

In Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654 (9^th Cir. 1977) this court adopted a five-part standard to provide guidance on the proper use of extraordinary writs.  See Will v. United States, 389 U.S.  90, 95 (1967).

The guidelines include: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to attain the relief he desires; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the district court’s order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for the federal rules; and (5) whether the district court’s order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression.  See In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 688 F.2d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982), aff’d, Arizona

v. U.S. District Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983).

 In Bauman, this Court acknowledged that it will be rare if a case arises where all guidelines point in the same direction or is even relevant.  Id. at 655.  Although all five factors need not be satisfied in order for mandamus to issue, ‘it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, is dispositive.’” Calderon v. United States

District Court, 134 F.3d 981, 983-984 (9th Cir. 1998).  

 

A. Factor 3:  The District Court’s Refusal to Adjudicate Fraud on the Court  Constitutes Clear Error. 

 

          In its opposition, the Government asserted that the Cardiff was merely raising a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  Crim. Dkt. 241 at 7-8.  The trial court agreed, holding that courts have limited authority to review the sufficiency of evidence presented to the grand jury and challenges to the reliability or competence of that evidence are generally not grounds for dismissal.  Crim. Dkt. 267 at 24 (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S.

36, 54 (1992) and Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 261

(1988).  

As a threshold matter, the evidence of fraud on the court was never presented to the Grand Jury. Moreover, neither Williams nor Bank of Nova Scotia speak to a court’s inherent, equitable duty to adjudicate a Rule 60(d)(3) fraud-on-the-court claim alleging that a court-appointed officer filed fabricated materials that then shaped judicial rulings and the case architecture. That duty springs from Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944), and is repeatedly applied by the Ninth Circuit in In re

Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119–23 (9th Cir. 1999), United States v. Estate of

Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 443–45 (9th Cir. 2011), and United States v. Sierra Pacific Industries, 862 F.3d 1157, 1167–69 (9th Cir. 2017). Those decisions make clear that fraud on the court concerns the integrity of the tribunal, not evidentiary sufficiency, and it is a matter the judge must resolve. The court’s reliance on the grand-jury line of cases to avoid deciding a Rule 60(d)(3) motion was therefore clear legal error.  

Contrary to the Government’s argument, and the Court’s ruling, fraud on the court is not a question of whether there is sufficient evidence to indict; rather, it is a structural problem that undermines the integrity of the proceedings themselves.  Hazel-Atlas at 246; Levander, at 1119.  Fraud on the court may be raised at any time because it strikes at the ability of the judicial process to function impartially.  Stonehill, at 444.  To treat the issue as one of sufficiency is to confuse an issue of judicial integrity into a question of trial proof, a position unsupported by law.  Indeed, fraud on the court is an equitable remedy that appeals to the integrity of the judicial process.   Nor can the Government or a trial court cure this defect by insisting the jury sort it out at trial. A jury cannot adjudicate whether an officer of the court falsified filings or corrupted judicial proceedings; that duty rests squarely with the court itself. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991). Indeed, Hazel-Atlas, Stonehill, Levander and Sierra Pacific all hold that courts have an inherent duty to purge fraud on the court.  No case supports the district court’s conclusion that such fraud may be deferred to jurors. Moreover, the evidence of the Receiver’s fraud is unrebutted.  The IRS confirmed that the Receiver’s filings were fabricated.  Similarly, the Government did not deny or dispute that the documents it intends to introduce at trial originated from the Receiver. 

The trial judge also referred to the FTC Case where the trial judge similarly refused to reach the issue of whether the receiver’s fraud on the court supported striking the forged document in Docket 657.  Dkt. 267at 24.  In that case, the trial court held that  Rule 60 limited relief based on fraud on the court to dismissal of an action, not striking a docket entry, that the motion could be denied as the case was closed and that a motion under Rule 60(b) must be filed no later than a year after the judgment was entered.  Dkt. 738 at 1-2.  The Court noted that Dkt. 657 was filed four years before filing of the motion on a case where the final judgment was entered.  Dkt. 738 at 2.  The Court clearly erred overlooking the fact that Mrs. Cardiff’s motion was brought under Rule

60(d), which has no time limit, and invoked the inherent power of the Court.  Dkt. 733 at 4, 7-8.  Moreover, the FOIA evidence was not discovered until late 2024.

In addition to the FOIA evidence addressed in Petitioner’s case, Mrs. Cardiff introduced evidence in the FTC Case that IRS internal procedures for settling cases were time consuming, highly structured and that the IRS’ search for records under FOIA was, in the absence of contrary evidence,

presumptively reliable. Dkt. 733 at 13-17.  These facts negate the possibility that the Receiver obtained a multi-million dollar settlement from the IRS within six (6) days by way of a phone call unsupported by any documents whatsoever.

 In sum, the trial judge in the FTC Case failed to recognize that fraud on the court is not limited to remedies under Rule 60(b)(3) but is governed by Rule 60(d) and the inherent power of the courts.  The trial court similarly erred in ruling that a court could not strike a pleading based on fraud on the Court and seemed to indicate that the only remedy for fraud on the court is dismissal of the entire case.  See Levander, at 1119 (court may amend order obtained through fraud)  The trial court’s refusal to reach the issue of fraud on the court in the FTC Case, as in this case, is clear legal error . 

B. Factor 1:  Whether Petitioner Has Other Adequate Means to Obtain Relief.

Because fraud on the court has been shown and remains unrebutted, the harm to the judicial process is immediate and irreparable. Allowing the Government to press forward in a prosecution infected by a court-appointed receiver’s fabrications compromises the tribunal itself. Once fraud on the court has shaped pretrial rulings, influenced discovery, or skewed plea negotiations, no appeal can later restore the integrity of the process. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized that courts have an independent duty to confront fraud at the moment it is uncovered, precisely because it inflicts systemic injury not remediable on review. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991). Structural defects such as fraud on the court are not subject to harmless-error analysis and cannot be cured on appeal. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991). Mandamus is therefore the only adequate remedy to confine the district court to its duty and to preserve the integrity of the judicial machinery.

This case presents structural fraud that disables ordinary litigation tools.

The record shows the FTC receivership order vested the Receiver with exclusive custody and control of all assets and documents, authorized him to secure the premises, and directed that he cooperate with civil and criminal law-enforcement and provide broad access to records and electronic data. FTC Dk. 46 at 5-6, 18-25, Dkt. 59 at 8, 22-26.   The Receiver, in fact, exercised that authority by (among other things) signing Stored Communications Act consents, waiving corporate privileges, and delivering 308 GB of Google Drive data and QuickBooks files to DOJ, embedding the Receiver in the Government’s case-building pipeline.  FTC Dkt. 79 at 4. 

Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the indictment did not challenge “sufficiency of the evidence.” It alleged fraud on the court predicated on court-officer forgeries (fake IRS “Amendment No. 2” and an altered email), further stating that the prosecution’s proof “relies heavily” on documents sourced through the Receiver’s control. The Government’s opposition expressly reframed Petitioner’s motion as a sufficiency challenge and urged denial on that basis, rather than contesting the structural-fraud showing. The district court then adopted the evidentiary framing and declined to adjudicate fraud on the court before trial. 

There is no adequate alternative to mandamus. A merits appeal after trial cannot restore the integrity of proceedings built on a record that per the receivership framework remains pervasively sourced through a court officer whose filings now include a forged IRS claim filing (FTC Dkts. 654, 657) Ordinary motions (e.g. Suppression, Rule 29) presuppose a reliable documentary spine which is precisely what the fraud allegation removes. When the taint infects the ability to litigate pretrial motions, only supervisory mandamus can compel a threshold ruling on structural fraud.

C. Factor 2:  Irreparable Prejudice Not Correctable On Appeal.

The error is not limited to what may happen at trial.  Pretrial motions that have been litigated were decided on a record curated by a court-appointed receiver who, unbeknownst to the Court, committed fraud on the Court.  The Court must have presumed that the Receiver was acting in good faith when, in fact, he did not.  Fraud on the court is a structural defect the court must address now to preserve the integrity of the proceedings. 

Thus, the prejudice is immediate and unfixable later. Because the

Receiver had exclusive custody of company systems and documents, the Government’s proof and the discovery utilized for any pretrial motion flows from that custodian.^[7]  See e.g. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 

 

On top of that, the IRS fabrication: the Receiver filed an “IRS Claim

Update” on September 16, 2021 (FTC Dkt. 657) purportedly eliminated the 2014 IRS tax liability, but the May 27, 2025 FOIA response reports the IRS found no records of the “Amendment No. 2,” no transmitting fax logs, and no related correspondence with the Receiver i.e., the IRS never filed the document the Receiver used in court. 

This sort of structural problem simply constitutes irreparable prejudice that cannot be repaired.

D. Factor 4: Persistent Disregard of Federal Rules and Judicial Integrity.

The trial court decision to treat structural fraud as an issue of sufficiency of the evidence and wait until trial to address the issue disregards the controlling Supreme Court precedent (Hazel-Atlas and Chambers) that courts have an immediate, independent duty to address fraud when raised.                Similarly, the Government does not dispute that evidence in support of its charges were obtained from the Receiver, whose misconduct stands unrebutted by any evidence from the Government.   This is not an isolated ruling. Defendant’s claims of Receiver misconduct were brushed aside and

 

record or prove exculpatory use. Petitioner’s reply documented the resulting gaps (e.g., missing Nest Cam video) and DOJ’s awareness of pending destruction.  FTC Dkt. 246 at 4-5.

 

ignored in the parallel FTC Case without reaching the merits.  Now, in the criminal case, the district court refused to exercise its inherent authority under Rule 60(d)(3) and controlling precedent. This shows a pattern and not an isolated error.  Treating structural fraud as if it were a Rule 12(b) sufficiency motion demonstrates repeated disregard of the governing framework, which this Court has recognized as a hallmark of mandamus.  

The record reflects a pattern of treating court-integrity issues as ordinary evidentiary disputes. In adjudicating Petitioner’s motion to suppress, the court emphasized that “the possession of the receiver is the possession of the court” and held Petitioner lacked standing to contest searches once the Receiver took control. Crim. Dkt. 267 at 19.  That very premise heightens rather than diminishes the court’s responsibility to test whether its own courtappointed officer corrupted the record later used by the prosecution. Yet when presented with proof that the Receiver altered Petitioner’s email and filed a false IRS claim update (Civil Dkts. 654, 657), the court again declined to reach the merits, labeling the dispute as a issue to be resolved by the jury.  Crim.

Dkt. at 23.

                        E. Factor 5:  This Petition Raises New and Important Issues.     

 

This Petition presents an important issue of federal law: whether a district court may defer ruling on unrebutted allegations of fraud on the court in a criminal proceeding and allow the government to proceed with documents, data and records tainted by a court appointed receiver. The Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed whether “wait until trial” is a permissible response to allegations of fraud on the court. Resolution here will provide essential guidance.

When subsequently confronted with evidence that the Receiver altered or forged: (1) an email submitted in the civil docket and (2) an IRS claim update that the IRS itself cannot locate or verify, the court must determine whether the entire record is tainted by the receiver’s misconduct. The Ninth Circuit’s supervisory power is precisely suited to address such institutional problems, which lie beyond the competence of a jury and must be determined prior to any trial.

        V.      Conclusion and Relief Requested

Fraud on the court is a structural defect that strikes at the heart of judicial integrity and must be addressed whenever it comes to light. HazelAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944); Levander v. Prober, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). While the Government disputes whether the Receiver improperly altered an email concerning the accuracy of his accounting, and intended to destroy evidence that would have helped Petitioner in his defense of criminal charges, Petitioner presented unrebutted documentary proof that a court-appointed Receiver fabricated evidence, i.e. the FOIA responses from the Internal Revenue Service confirming that no amended IRS claim was filed, directly contradicting the Receiver’s submission. The idea that the IRS would settle a multi-million dollar claim within six (6) days and do so over the phone without documentation is preposterous on its face.  

Moreover, the Government did not dispute the authenticity of these materials or deny that it intends to rely on Receiver-produced documents at trial. By framing the issue as one of “sufficiency of the evidence,” the district court refused to act and directed Defendant to await trial. That ruling is clear error: sufficiency concerns whether the Government can prove the statutory elements of an offense, whereas fraud on the court concerns whether the judicial process itself has been corrupted. A jury cannot resolve that question; it is the independent duty of the court. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.

32, 44–45 (1991); United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011).

Because the district court declined to exercise its duty, mandamus is the only means of relief. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). The unrebutted record establishes fabrication by an officer of the court and leaves no factual dispute to resolve.

Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss the indictment outright.  In the alternative, the Court should issue a writ directing the district court to: (1) adjudicate fraud on the court on a priority schedule; (2) stay all criminal deadlines and pretrial motions pending those findings; (3) if fraud is found, exclude all Receiver sourced materials unless the Government proves an independent, untainted source by clear and convincing evidence.

                                                           Respectfully submitted,

 

/s/Stephen R. Cochell

Attorney for Petitioner

                 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

 

This Petition complies with Fed. R. App. P. 21(d) and 32(a)(7). It contains approximately 6944 words, excluding the caption, table of contents, index of authorities and certificates.

 

                                                                     /s/ Stephen R. Cochell

Stephen R. Cochell

 

 

                 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 

I hereby certify that on September 5, 2025 I electronically filed the foregoing Petition for Writ of Mandamus, the Addendum to the Petition with the Clerk of the Court by using the appellate CM/ECF system.

Service has been accomplished via e-mail to counsel on the attached Email Service List set out below.  The district court has been provided with a copy of these documents via email to the trial court’s coordinator.

 

 

 

 

                                                                               /s/ Stephen R. Cochell

                                                                               Stephen R. Cochell

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

Petitioner is aware of related proceedings that involve substantially the same parties and overlapping factual background:

1.     FTC v. Cardiff, et al., No. 5:18-cv-02104-DMG (C.D. Cal.) (the “FTC Action”). The district court appointed the Receiver whose conduct forms the basis of the present petition.

2.     United States v. Jason Edward Thomas Cardiff, No. 5:23-cr00021-JGB (C.D. Cal.) (the “Criminal Case”). This is the underlying criminal prosecution in which the district court denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss based on fraud on the court.

3.     United States v. Cardiff, Ninth Circuit Case No. 25-3616,  25-3781 (consolidated). This is an appeal of a judgment on a bond in the same district court proceeding and involves the same Petitioner. Petitioner is not aware of any other related cases currently pending in this Court.

                                                                               /s/ Stephen R. Cochell

                                                                               Stephen R. Cochell